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A SURVEY OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY
ACT ON EMPLOYER UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICES
KEITH W. BLINN
With the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,1
many problems were posed concerning its effect on the extensive body
of decisional law established through twelve years of administration of
the predecessor Wagner Act.2 While it is virtually assumed that the
Taft-Hartley Act will be amended, in almost all quarters there is a
measure of agreement that some of the changes effected in the Wagner
Act by the amendments were justified as the result of the experience
gained in administering the Wagner Act. Even the most severe criti-
cism from "labor" is primarily directed toward the newly established
union unfair labor practices. The scope of this article is not to analyze
in detail but rather to survey the impart of the Taft-Hartley Act upon
the employer unfair labor practices.
While the basic philosophy of the law remains unchanged, certain
of the fundamental premises have been qualified and altered includ-
ing the finding that industrial strife is not solely attributable to the
denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal of employers to accept the procedures of collective bargaining
but that "experience has further demonstrated that certain practices
by some labor organizations, their officers, and members have the in-
tent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce
through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest. . . ."3 The Taft-
Hartley Act also expressly recognizes that employees have the"... right
to refrain from any and all ... [concerted activities].14
A. COVERAGE OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT.
Despite suggestions from certain quarters that the Board's juris-
diction be restricted so that a greater area might be left for State ac-
tion, the Taft-Hartley Act like the predecessor Wagner Act is based
upon unfair labor practices and questions of representation "affecting
commerce". 5 This latter term is broadly defined as "in commerce, or
burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or
1 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong. 1st Sess.,
61 Stat. -, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1947 Supp.).
2National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
(1940).
3 § 1 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. All citations to sections
refer to the amended Act unless otherwise specified.
4§ 7.
5§ 10(a).
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having led to or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or ob-
structing commerce or the free flow of commerce". These provisions
were held as broad as the constitutional power of Congress.7 Section
10 (a) was amended to provide "that the Board is empowered by
agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to such
agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining,
manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where pre-
dominantly local in character) even though such cases may involve
labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provisions of the State
or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by
such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this
*Act or has received a construction inconsistent therewith." This has
served to clarify some ". . . overtones of meaning that regardless of
-the consent of the National Board, ... [a State board] ... is excluded
from enforcing rights of collective bargaining in all industries within
its borders as to which Congress has granted opportunity to invoke
the authority of the National Board,"s which resulted from the Su-
preme Court opinion in the Bethlehem case. Accordingly, it is now
possible for the National Board to make working agreements with
State boards so that the latter may dispose of a large number of em-
ployer-employee disputes where hearing otherwise might be indefi-
nitely postponed by the N.L.R.B. due to budgetary limitations or the
pressure of a large backlog of cases9 providing the State legislation is
consistent with the federal legislation and is interpreted consistent with
it.1° A limitation in the coverage of the Taft-Hartley Act has been
effected by defining the term "employee" as expressly excluding super-
visory employees," thus bringing to a close a rather long and bitter
struggle within the Board itself. The Board's administrative policy on
supervisory employees had been vacillating ;12 however, starting with
the Packard case' 3 the Board had started to re-establish the status of
supervisory employees as "employees within the meaning of the Act"
thus permitting them to constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
6§ 2(6) and (7).
7N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).8 Bethlehem Steel Co. et al v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S.
767 (1947), concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter at page 778.9 It is clear that the Board intends to continue to exercise its administrative
discretion by refusing for administrative reasons to take jurisdiction in certain
cases. In Matter of Duke Power Co., 77 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1948).
-10 For a detailed analysis see, Smith, "The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdic-
tion over Labor Relations," 46 MICH. L. REV. 593 (1948).
11 Supervisor is defined as ". . . any individual having authority, in the interest
of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them,
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in
connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires independent judgment." § 2(11).
12 11 N.L.R.B. ANN REP. 30-35 (1945); Note (1947) 32 IOWA L. REV. 595.
-13In Matter of Packard Motor Car Company, 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
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of collective bargaining. The effect of the new definition of "employee"
is to reverse the court approved administrative construction of the
Wagner Act 14 and finally settle the controversy so that supervisory
employees cannot be included within a bargaining unit or constitute
a separate unit by themselves. The Board in considering a representa-
tion case' 5 under the amended Act determined that the statutory defi-
nition of "supervisory employee" merely continued the Board's pre-
vious policy in determining at what point an employee becomes mana-
gerial or supervisory. The Board pointed out that the problem is "to
some extent necessarily a matter of degree of authority exercised
.... [and includes those] who formulate and effectuate management
policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their
employer . . . ." Thus, there was a heavy reliance upon the statutory
requirement that for the position to be supervisory, it must require
"the use of independent judgment". A further limitation in the cover-
age of the Act was effected through the specific exclusion of any in-
dividual having the status of an independent contractor from the term
"employee". 16 In the Hearst case" the Supreme Court considered the
status of newsboys as employees and speaking through Justice Rutledge
it was held that the economic facts such as the inequality of bargaining
power and the dependency of the newsboys on the company for daily
earnings was such that it made the relationship more nearly one of
employment than of an individual business enterprise and in view of
the social purpose underlying the legislation such a classification might
outweigh a technical legal classification. The Senate report indicates a
clear legislative policy to override Board policy by stating ". . . The
legal effect of the amendment therefore is merely to make it clear that
the question whether or not a person is an employee is a question of
law, since the term is not meant to embrace persons outside that cate-
gory under the general principle of the law of agency."' 8
B. EMPLOYER'S RESPONSIBILITY.
Under the Wagner Act the employer was responsible for "... any
person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly...,,9
While the Supreme Court consistently reiterated that the question is
not one of legal liability in damages or for penalties on principles of
agency or respondent superior, but only whether the Act condemned
such activities as unfair labor practices so far as the employer gained ad-
14Packard Motor Car Company v. N.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
'15 In Matter of Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corporation, 75 N.L.R.B. 320(1947).
16§ 2(3).
"N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
1893 Cong. Rec. 6441 (1947).
19§ 2(2) of the Wagner Act.
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vantages in the bargaining process ;20 nevertheless, the actual decided
cases did not fall far beyond the pale of the technical rules of agency.21
Within the recognized principles of agency, the agent, acting within the
sphere of his apparent authority, may subject his principal to liability by
acts done in violation of secret instructions or limitations which were
unknown to the third person. However, the employer definition was
amended to include ". . any person acting as an agent of any em-
ployer directly or indirectly .... -22 Bearing directly on the problem
is the newly added definition of the term "agent" which provides "In
determining whether any person is acting as an 'agent' of another
person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the
question of whether the specific acts performed were actually author-
ized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling."3 Regardless of
the extent of change actually achieved by the change in language, it
seems unquestionably the intent of Congress to abrogate any effects
of the I.A.M. case 24 beyond the sphere of established agency principles.
As Senator Taft stated ". . . [it] restores the law of agency as it has
been developed at common law. '25
C. THE "FREE SPEECH" CLAUSE.
Until the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, "free speech" in unfair
labor practice cases was evaluated and protected on the basis of a
constitutional guarantee, 26 and the Supreme Court in stating, "The mere
fact that language merges into a course of conduct does not put that
whole course without the range of otherwise applicable administrative
power. In determining whether the Company actually interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees, the Board has the right to look
at what the Company has said, as well as what it has done. .... -27
Thus, the propriety of the "totality doctrine" was firmly established.
However, section 8 (c) expressly provides that "The expression of any
views, arguments, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in
written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute'or be
evidence of any unfair labor practice. . . if such expression contains
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit". The direct im-
20 International Association of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72 (1940), re-
hearing denied 311 U.S. 72 (1940) ; H. J. Heinz Company v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S.
514 (1941).
21 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 160 (1933); Cox, "Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act." (1947) 61 HARV. L. REV. 1 p. 8-12 (1947).
22§ 2(2).
23§. 2(13).
24 International Association of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72 (1940), re-
hearing denied 311 U.S. 729 (1941).
25 93 Cong. Rec. 6859 (1947).
26 Sinsheimer, "Employer Free Speech-A Comparative Analysis," 14 U. of
CHIC. L. REV. 617 (1947).
27 N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 478 (1941).
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pact of this amendment is upon the totality doctrine since the speech
cannot be evidencd of an unfair labor practice unless, standing alone,
it is violative of the Act by containing a threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit. It is worthy of note that while the former General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, Gerhard P. Van
Arkel, concurs in this interpretation of section 8 (c) 2s there are others
who feel that the Board should continue to apply the totality doctrine.29
During debate on this section Senator Taft illustrated his view by
agreeing with Senator Pepper that if on Monday an employer said to
his employees: "I hate labor unions, and I think they are a menace to
the country !", nevertheless this remark would not be competent evi-
dence to determine whether a union steward discharged by the same
employer shortly thereafter was fired for union activity.30 If Senator
Taft's illustration is to be applied literally, it would restrict the use
of evidence in labor board cases more than ordinarily applied in our
courts. The board in at least one case has indicated an adjustment to
this interpretation of section 8 (c).31 In the Bailey case the Trial
Examiner prior to the amendment found that the respondent had vio-
lated section 8 (a) (1) by engaging in an unlawful course of conduct
including the distribution of certain "anti-Union circulars and notices".
The Board considered the case after the amendments and in concurring
that respondent had violated the said section stated, "Our finding in
this respect, however, is based solely upon the promises of economic
benefits made by the respondent to its employees immediately pre-
ceeding the election. We do not, as did the Trial Examiner, predicate
our unfair labor practice finding upon the statements contained in the
circulars and notices distributed by the respondent, for although they
clearly indicate the respondent's antipathy toward the Union and its
leaders and the respondent's preference for individual bargaining, they
appear to be only such expressions of opinion as are protected by the
constitutional guarantee of free speech. ... We do not base our 8 (1)
finding on a course of conduct theory. "32
28Van Arkel, "An Analysis of the Labor Management Relations Act" (1947),
p. 23-26, Practicing Law Institute (1947); C.C.H. Lab. L. Course p. 1546(1947).
29 Cox, "Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act." (1947) 61
HARV. L. REV. 1 p. 15-20 (1947).
3093 Cong. Rec. 6604; Mulroy, "The Taft-Hartley Act in Action," 15 U. of
CHIC. L. REV. 595, 611 (1948), in which the writer quoting N.A.M. General
Counsel Smethurst states "obviously, this construction would impose a harsher
rule of evidence even than existed under common law rules in criminal cases."
31 In Matter of The Bailey Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 941 (1948) ; also see In Matter
of Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, 75 N.L.R.B. 883 (1948).
2 In H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong. 1st Sess., the house conference managers
reported "Both the House bill and the Senate amendment contained pro-
visions designed to protect the rights of both employers and labor organiza-
tions to free speech. The conference agreement adopts the provisions of the
House bill in this respect with one change derived from the Senate amend-
[Vol. 32
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D. LIMITATIONS UPON PARTY FILING UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
CHARGE.
The amended Act provides that the Board's facilities shall not be
available to a labor organization until it has filed certain information
concerning the organization 33 and its offices have executed "non com-
munist affidavits". 3 4 The Congressional objective of the latter require-
ment was to remove Communist Party members and persons affiliated
with the Party from official positions in the unions.3 5 As the result
of General Counsel Denham's interpretation that section 9 (h) re-
quired the officers of the parent body such as the A.F. of L. and the
C.I.O. to execute non communist affidavits before any of their local
unions could use the facilities of the N.L.R.B., there was a virtual
boycott of the N.L.R.B. until the Board itself reversed this ruling on
the ground that section 9 (h) was ambiguous and that the purpose of
the law would be better realized through a policy not requiring the
officers of the parent body to execute these affidavits.36 In view of
the fact that "any person" 37 may file a charge alleging that an em-
ployer has engaged in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce, and
ment.... The practice which the Board has had in the past of using speeches
and publications of employers concerning labor organizations and collective
bargaining arrangements as evidence, no matter how irrelevant or immaterial,
that some later act of the employer had an illegal purpose gave rise to the
necessity of this change in the law. The purpose is to protect the right of
free speech when what the employer says or writes is not of a threatening
nature or does not promise a prohibited favorable discrimination." U.S.
Cong. Serv.-80th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 1151 (1947).
33§ 9(f) and (g).
34 § 9(h) provides "... and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge
made by a labor organization . . . unless there is on file with the Board an
affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve month
period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any
national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or
constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated
with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not the member of or
supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the
United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
methods."
35 H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. states, "At least 11 great national
unions and a large number of local unions seem to have fallen into the hands
of Communists, although in every case Communists appear to compose only
a very small minority of the membership. In most of these cases the rank
and file object to communistic influence in their unions. By the bill of rights
set forth in section 8 (c), the bill helps them to rid themselves of communistic
control. Section 9(f) (6) makes it incumbent upon the union leaders who
now tolerate Communist infiltration in their organizations, affiliates, and
locals, and temporize with it, to clean house or risk loss of the rights under
the new act." For a dicussion of the problems concerning the constitutionality
of this provision see, Note (1948) 48 COL. L. REV. 253. Compare: National
Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp 146 (D.C. D.C. 1948).
38 In Matter of Northern Virginia Broadcasters, Inc., Radio Station WARL,
75 N.L.R.B. 11 (1947). For a criticism of this case see, Note (1947) 27
NEBR. L. REV. 120.37Rules and Regulations Series 5 § 203.9 provides "A charge that any person
has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting com-
merce may be made by any person." C.C.H. Fed. Adm. Proc. p. 37, 503.
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section 9 (h) is applicable only to labor organizations, it is obvious
that through the use of charges filed by individuals, a labor organiza-
tion may evade section 9 (h) ; however, in the case of a refusal to
bargain charge under section 8 (a) (5) it appears that the union must
have complied with the filing provisions before the Board will issue
a remedial order under this section.38 This view has been reinforced
by a statement of policy made by N.L.R.B. Associate General Counsel
Brooks in advising that while the Board will continue to process dis-
crimination charges filed by individuals, it will not permit non com-
plying labor organizations to evade the filing requirements through
the subterfuge of individual filed charges in refusal to bargain cases. 9
However, upon a' charge filed by an employer, the Board may find
that the union, although a non complying union, has refused to bargain
with the employer in violation of section 8 (b) (3); but the Board
carefully noted, however, that this does not amount to a certification
of the non complying union and it is ordered to bargain with the em-
ployer upon request.40
Under the Wagner Act, the Board has consistently maintained that
no doctrine of laches was applicable to it when issuing a remedial
back pay order despite the fact that it might reach back over a sub-
stantial period and thus there was no limitation of time within which
a charge might be filed or the complaint might be issued.41 However,
the Board considered circumstances which seemed to justify limiting
the period for which back pay would be ordered such as inexcusable
delay in filing charges 2 and delay in issuing the complaint.4 During
the legislative discussion of the Taft-Hartley Act the House bill recom-
mended that "no complaint should issue stating a charge of an unfair
labor practice that occurred more than 6 months before the charge was
filed, or based on a charge that was filed more than 6 months before
the complaint was issued."'44 In the joint conference it was agreed to
accept the Senate amendment which provided ". . . no complaint should
issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than 6
months before the filing of the charge and the service of a copy of the
charge upon the person against whom the charge is made... .-45 Hence
38 In Matter of Marshall and Bruce Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 90 (1947).
39 C.C.H. Lab. L. Serv. Rep. Letter No. 386, p. 11 (Feb. 19, 1948).40 In Matter of National Maritime Union of America, 78 N.L.R.B. No. 137, de-
cided August 17, 1948.
4In Matter of Baker Manufacturing Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1948); In Matter
of Gibbs Corporation, 74 N.L.R.B. 1182 (1947).42 1n Matter of Kalamazoo Coaches, Inc., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (1946); In Matter
of Chas. E. Austin, Inc., 49 N.L.R.B. 1048 (1943).
43In Matter of Louisville Railway Company, 69 N.L.R.B. 691 (1946).
44H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; U.S. Cong. Serv.-80th Cong. 1st
Sess. p. 1159 (1947).
45 § 10(b). Rules and Regulations Series 5 § 203.14 provides: "Upon the filing of
a charge, the charging party shall be responsible for the timely and proper
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cases may be delayed after the charge is filed as the result of either ad-
ministrative carelessness or justifiable administrative difficulty during
which the respondent may have no relief; but, the respondent may be
assured that "stale" discriminatory discharge cases where charges are
not filed and of which he has no notice will not continue to plague
him after the running of the six month period of limitation.4
E. RULES OF EVIDENCE AND REVIEW OF BoAR ORDERS.
The Board formerly was freed of the technical common law rules
of evidence under the statutory authority that in connection with the
hearings before the Trial Examiner in unfair labor practice cases
".. . The rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall
not be controlling. . . . " This flexible rule of admitting evidence
coupled with the provision that the Board's findings of facts ". . . if sup-
ported by evidence, shall be conclusive [upon the reviewing court] . . ."
which was interpreted by the Supreme Court as meaning "substantial
evidence",48 in the opinion of the House, gave too great a latitude in
choosing the evidence that it would believe and use as the basis of its
findings and too great an effect to the findings that rest on such evi-
dence.49 Thus, when the House report referred to certain court de-
cisions describing the results as "shocking injustices", "overwhelmingly
opposed by the evidence", and findings that "strain our credulity", it
concluded that the reviewing courts under the Supreme Court inter-
pretation of the statute were powerless to correct the Board's abuses.
The first criticized portion was corrected by providing that ". . . any
such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance
with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United
States, . . ."50 thus leaving to the Board and the reviewing court the
determination whether it was impracticable to conform to the district
court rules of evidence and if error was committed whether it resulted
in a substantial error. In rectifying the second basis of criticism,
reference is still made to the Board's findings of fact as being con-
clusive if supported by substantial evidence but it is carefully qualified
service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made.
The Regional Director will as a matter of course, cause a copy of such
charge to be served upon the person against whom the charge is made, but
he shall not be deemed to assume responsibility for such service." C.C.H.
Fed. Adm. Proc. p. 37, 504.4 1 In Matter of California Metal Trades Ass'n. et. al, decided by N.L.R.B. Nov.
3, 1948.
4 § 10(b) of the Wagner Act.
48 Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
49 H.R. Rep. -No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947) which cites as examples
Wilson & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 126 F.(2d) 114, 117 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942); N.L.R.B.
v. Columbia Products Corp., 141 F. (2d) 687 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1944) ; and N.L.R.B.
v. Union Pacific Stages, Inc., 99 F. (2d) 153 (C.C.A 9th, 1938).
io§ 10(b).
1948]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
by the phrase ". . . on the record considered as a whole. . . "51 The
report of the joint conference committee expressly states that the new
language of the judicial review section will very materially broaden
the scope of the courts' reviewing power and while it is not intended
to provide a trial de novo it will prevent the alleged abdication of the
courts to the Board. In this connection the amended Act requires that
the Board in making findings of fact must base them ".. . upon the pre-
ponderance of the testimony taken .... ,52 Under the newly granted pow-
er of review it is intended that the courts have a duty to see that the
Board observes this limitation and that it not infer facts not supported
by evidence or that it concentrate on one element of proof and ignore
other proof without some adequate explanation of its reasons for dis-
regarding it.
F. INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT AND COERCION.
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act remains unchanged in language and
still forbids the employer from "interfering with, restraining or coerc-
ing employees" in the exercise of their rights of self organization
guaranteed in section 7 of the Act. It is significant that while it was
assumed that the right to self organization also included the right to
"refrain from such activity" the Act now gives express recognition of
this right.53 Excluding the derivative violations of this section un-
doubtedly the greatest bulk of the cases involving independent inter-
ference, restraint and coercion arise out of either oral or written state-
ments. Accordingly, the previously discussed new interpretations of
employer responsibility and free speech will have the greatest impact
upon this unfair labor practice. Subject to these qualifications conduct
previously proscribed by this section including espionage and surveil-
lance,54 economic coercion, 55 anti-union statements,5 6 unduly restrictive
non solicitation rules, 7 questioning employees concerning union mem-
bership," and various other activities will continue to fall within the
ban of this unfair labor practice.
51§ 10(e) and (f).
52H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. U.S. Cong., Serv.-80th Cong., 1st
Sess. p. 1161-3 (1947).
53 Footnote 4, supra.
54N.L.R.B. v. Collins and Aikman Corp., 146 F. (2d) 454 (C.C.A. 4th, 1945);
In Matter of Sohio Pipe Line Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 858 (1948).
55 N.L.R.B. v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 140 F. (2d) 404 (C.C.A. 5th,
1944); In Matter of O'Keefe and Merritt Mfg. Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 117
(1947).
51 N.L.R.B.v. Vincennes Steel Corp., 107 F. (2d) 169 (C.C.A. 7th, 1941); Cf.
In Matter of Atlanta Metallic Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 208 (1947).
57Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Daykin, "Em-
ployees' Right to Organize on Company Time and Property," 42 ILL. L. REV.
301 (1947).
58 In Matter of Ames Spot Welder Company, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 352 (1947).
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G. DOMINATION OF OR INTERFERENCE WITH A LABOR ORGANIZATION.
While the substance of section 8 (a) (2) remains unchanged and
continues to declare it to be an unfair labor practice for the employer
to interfere with the employee's right of self organization by means
of the so-called company dominated union and forbids the employer
from "dominating or interfering with the formation or administration
of any labor organization", 59 amendments made by section 10 (c) and
9 (c) (2) seek to wipe out a long standing disparity of treatment ac-
corded non affiliated dominated unions which has been the subject of
much criticism. Thus, in connection with the proposed House bill the
House report comments: "A second change forbids the admitted prac-
tice of the old Board of discriminating against independent unions,
simply because they are independent, by ordering with respect to them
more drastic penalties than it orders for unions affiliated with the A.F.
of L. or the C.I.O. in similar circumstances. . .."60
Congress found that this disparity took the form in the case of
affiliated unions in permitting "employers to provide bulletin boards
in their plants for the union's use, to give union officials preferred
treatment in laying off workers and calling them back, and to allow
shop stewards without losing pay to confer not only with the employer
but with the employees as well, and to transact other union business in
the plant... [while not permitting] the employer to do the same things
for nonaffiliated unions .... "61 There was also a disparity of treatment
in connection with the type of remedial order issued.6 2 The Taft-Hart-
ley Act now makes it mandatory on the Board to apply the same rules
of decision irrespective of whether or not the labor organization affect-
ed is affiiliated with a labor organization national or international in
scope.6
3
H. "DIscRIMINATION IN REGARD TO HIRE OR TENURE OF EMPLOYMENT.
In the basic wording of section 8 (a) (3) there has been no change
in the unfair labor practice which forbids an employer from discrim-
inating ". . . in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization. . . ." But again another section of the
amended Act has a serious impact in that it is provided that "no order
5912 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 27-28 (1947); N.L.R.B. v. J. H. Mathews & Co.,
156 F. (2d) 706 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1946).60 H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), which cites hearings by the
Special House Committee to Investigate the N.L.R.B., part 9 pages 1867,
1908-9, 2052-3, Part II, page 2242 and others.61 H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; U.S. Cong., Serv.-80th Cong., 1st
Sess. p. 1146 and 1160-1161 (1947).
62 Compare the Board's Order in the following cases: In Matter of Bradford
Machine Tool Company, 44 N.L.R.B. 759 (1942), and In Matter of Hancock
Brick and Tile Company, 44 N.L.R.B. 920 (1942).
63§ 10(c).
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of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an
employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to
him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged
for cause."64 While the Board has consistently maintained that in
administering this section of the Wagner Act it does not seek to in-
terfere with the normal exercise by an employer of his rights to select
or discharge his employees for any reason other than those forbidden
by the Act, it did normally find discriminatory treatment violative of
the Act if the action was prompted even in part by a desire or effort
to interfere with the free right of self organization although there
might exist concurrently a valid reason for such treatment of the
employee.6 5
The original House bill provided, "No order of the Board shall
require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has
been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay,
unless the weight of the evidence shows that such individual was not
suspended or discharged for cause. ' ' 66 In the House report on this bill
there is a reference to the Wyman-Gordon case 67 which it describes as
typical of the Board's attitude since that case involved the problem of
double motivation for discharge and the Board in ordering reinstate-
ment with back pay admitted that the employee was guilty of miscon-
duct but inferred that because he was a member or an official of a
union, that the latter and not the misconduct was the reason for his
discharge.68 While the language suggested by the House was not finally
incorporated in the amended Act, the joint conference committe clear-
ly indicated that the "suspended or discharged for cause" of section
10 (c) was intended to rectify the alleged abuse of inferring an
unlawful motive in the employer's action.6 9 It has been previously
discussed in subdivision E of this article, supra, that under the Taft-
Hartley Act, the Board's findings of fact can no longer be based merely
on some credible evidence but must be grounded upon a preponderance
of the testimony in the whole case.
A substantial change has been made in the proviso of section 8 (a)
(3) which formerly permitted various types of contracts providing
64§ 10(c).
6511 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 37 (1946).
66 H.R. 3020 as passed by the House of Representative April 17, 1947.
67 In Matter of Wyman-Gordon Company, 62 N.L.R.B. 561 (1945).
68 H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). For a study of the history
of the Taft-Hartley Act indicating a restriction of the protected area for
strikers' collective activity see Blinn, "Rights and Obligations of Strikers
Under the Taft-Hartley Act," 13 MO. L. REV. 1 (1948).
69 The conference committee report states that ". . . The conference agreement
omits the 'weight of evidence' language, since the Board, under the general
provisions of section 10 must act on a preponderance of the evidence .... "
H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; U.S. Cong., Serv.- 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. p. 1161 (1947).
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union security clauses. The amended Act authorizes only contracts
which (a) require membership as a condition of employment on or
after the thirtieth day of employment; and (b) after a majority of
the employees within the appropriate unit covered by such contract
have authorized the union to negotiate for such an agreement.7 0 Sec-
tion 9 (e) (1) provides the procedure for such elections while section
9 (e) (2) makes provision for elections to rescind the union's author-
ity to negotiate for such an agreement. Since it was a recognized fact
that many States had enacted laws or adopted constitutional provisions
to make all forms of compulsory unionism in those States illegal, Con-
gress in seeking to accomodate this Act to the State policy provided
in section 14 (b) that nothing in the Taft-Hartley Act was to be
construed as authorizing any closed shop, union shop, maintenance of
membership, or other form of compulsory unionism agreement in any
State where the execution of such an agreement was contrary to State
policy. 71 The Board has interpreted this as prohibiting it from con-
ducting a union shop election in those States thus making the State
law controlling 2 since there can be no valid union security clause with-
out the union shop election.
Assuming that the above discussed requirements are observed, the
next problem posed is the enforcement of the union security clause by
the employer upon request by the union. For some time the Board
had been attempting to reconcile the apparent conflict between giving
full amplification to the underlying philosophy of the right of self or-
ganization guaranteed in section 7 of the Act and at the same time
observing the private contract rights flowing out of a valid collective
bargaining contract containing some form of union security clause.
Thus, there was evolved a court approved policy of giving effect, with-
in limits, to the valid union security clauses where dual unionism was
the basis of the employee's nonmembership in the union which resulted
in his discharge or other discrimination against him.
7 3
While it appears that the previous decisional law continues to be
applicable in that the employer may not acquiesce in the union's demand
to rid the force of employees of those engaging in dual unionism, the
amended Act seeks to extend protection to the individual employee
from other possible arbitrary action by the union whereby he may be
70 § 8(a) (3).
7'H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; U.S. Cong., Serv.-80th Cong., 1st
Sess. p. 1166 (1947).
721n Matter of Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (1948).73 Wallace Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 323 U.S. 248 (1944); N.L.R.B. v. America White
Cross Laboratories, Inc., 160 F. (2d) 75 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1947); N.L.R.B.v.
Portland Lumber Mills, 158 F. (2d) 365 (C.C.A. 9th, 1946), writ of cert. dis-
missed 68 S. Ct. 347 (1948); 12 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 49 (1947). Cf. In
Matter of Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1948).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
expelled from membership and his discharge be demanded. 74 This pro-
tection is afforded by the further proviso that ". . . no employer shall
justify any discrimination against an employee for membership in a
labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms
and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender
the periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a condi-
tion of acquiring or retaining membership. '75 It has been suggested
that the union by demanding discharge of an employee before expulsion
would evade this section since it refers only to discrimination for
nonmembership in a labor organization.7 6 However, such an evasion
would only be applicable to cases where the employer assented to the
demand of the union which does not seem to be a true evasion since
such action would be equally possible absent any union security clause
in the collective bargaining agreement. A criticism suggested by Board
member, Reynolds, dissenting in the Lewis Meier case 77 that the union
should be made a co-respondent in the proceeding seems to be partially
answered by an amendment to section 10 (c) that back pay may be
required of the employer or the labor organization dependent upon
which was responsible for the discrimination.
I. REFUSAL TO BARGAIN.
Section 8 (a) (5) continues the language of a similar section in
the pre-existing law which required that employers bargain collectively
with the representative of employees within an appropriate bargaining
unit.78 Section 8 (b) (3) places a correlative duty on the labor organi-
zation which is the employee representative to bargain collectively with
the employer. Newly added section 8 (d) in defining the duty to bar-
gain adopts a substantial portion of the decisional law developed under
the Wagner Act.7 9 However, in stating that ". . such obligation does
74For discussion of numerous alleged abuses through the use of union security
clauses against minorities within the union see Senate Report No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) p. 6-7.
75 8(a) (3). By causing or attempting to cause the employer to discriminate
against an employee based upon nonmembership where membership in the
union has been denied or terminated other than on these grounds, the labor
organization's action will be violative of section 8(b) (2).
76 Van Arkel, "An Analysis of the Labor Management Relations Act," (1947)
p. 31, Practicing Law Institute (1947).
77 In Matter of Lewis Meier & Company, 73 N.L.R.B. 520 (1947).
78 For a detailed analysis see Weyand, "The Scope of Collective Bargaining
Under the Taft-Hartley Act," First Annual Report of New York University
Conference on Labor (1948).
79 H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514 (1941) ; Rapid Roller Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
126 F. (2d) 452 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942); cert. denied, 317 U.S. 650 (1942) ; Globe
Cotton Mills v. N.L.R.B., 103 F. (2d) 91 (C.C.A. 5th, 1939).
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not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
a concession.. . ." it was not intended to relieve the bargaining parties
from making counterproposals since the word "counterproposal" was
removed from an early draft of the bill and the word "concession"
substituted based upon an objection raised by the Chairman of the
Board. 0 Thus in re-emphasizing the fundamental federal philosophy
of the importance of free collective bargaining s ' one element is re-
moved and one new element added to the area formerly recognized as
good faith bargaining. Under the previous decisions the Board has
consistently held that the duty to bargain was a continuing one and
that the employer was obliged to negotiate with the accredited bargain-
ing agency concerning the modification, interpretation, and adminis-
tration of the existing contract . 2 However, section 8 (d) asserts that
the duty to bargain "... shall not be construed as requiring either party
to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions
contained in a contract for a fixed period ... ." Thus, the employer is
still obliged to continue to confer with the bargaining representative
concerning the application and interpretation of the contract during
its term but need not confer regarding its modification; the line be-
tween modification and interpretation may indeed become obscure.83
Where there is an existing collective bargaining contiact, there is added
as a part of the duty to bargain under section 8 (d) the requirement
that the party desiring to terminate or modify the agreement must
notify the other party in writing sixty days before the expiration of
the contract or sixty days before the proposed termination or modifica-
tion, offer to meet with the other party for the purpose of negotiating
a new agreement, notify the various state and federal mediation ser-
vices within thirty days after the first notice if no agreement has been
reached, and continue the existing agreement in effect for sixty days
after the first notice or until the expiration of the contract, whichever
is later, without resorting to a strike or lockout. As an additional as-
surance to the observance of this section other than the possible reme-
dial order directing the offending party to bargain, any employee who
80 Senate Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
81 N.L.R.B. General Counsel Denham, "The Taft-Hartley Act," 20 TENN. L.
REV. 168, 179 (1948), refers to the collective bargaining process under the Act
as ". . . the very heart of the Act .... It has been suggested that the legitimate
field of collective bargaining has been restricted by limitations imposed by
other sections of the Act such as restrictions on union security clauses,§ 8(a) (3), 8(b) (2) and 9(e), restrictions on check off of union dues and
assessments, § 302(a) and (c), restrictions on featherbedding provisions in
contracts, § 8(b) (6) and others. Weyand, "The Scope of Collective Bargain-
ing Under the Taft-Hartley Act," First Annual Report of New York Univer-
sity Conference on Labor at page 261 (1948).8 2 In Matter of Alexander Milburn Company, 62 N.L.R.B. 482, 510 (1945); 12
N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 36 (1947).
83 See Senator Taft's remarks, 93 Cong. Rec. 6860 (1947).
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engages in a strike during this period shall lose his status as an em-
ployee for the purposes of the protection of the Act. It would seem,
however, that the strike necessarily would have to be one which was
associated with a demand for termination or modification of the col-
lective bargaining agreement and not merely one arising out of some
unrelated grievance.
Under the Taft-Hartley Act the principle of majority rule continues
to exist but in amending the proviso of section 9 (a) 4 new importance
is given to the individual employee's rights within the frame work of
a system governed by majority rule.85 Under the Wagner Act the
Board with court approval 8 had given the proviso only limited effect
thus submerging the rights of the individual employee to the rights of
the exclusive bargaining representative; the individual had the right
of presenting his grievance but the exclusive bargaining representative
was given the right to be present and negotiate at every stage of the
consideration of the grievance. The revised proviso would make it
clear that the employee's right to present grievances exists indepen-
dently of the rights of the bargaining representative and thus the in-
dividual in presenting his grievance may become the dominant figure
and the bargaining representative the "silent listener".8 7
CONCLUSION
Since 1935 the federal labor policy has been charted through the
administration of the Wagner Act which dealt primarily with the
establishing of a free uncoerced atmosphere for collective bargaining
by seeking to dissipate the effect of certain conduct on the part of
employers determined to interfere with the employees right of free
organization. While the Taft-Hartley Act represents a substantial shift
in the federal labor policy by adding restrictions on the conduct of
labor organizations thus making both employers and labor organiza-
tions amenable to remedial orders of the Board, it must not be over-
looked that Title I is, in fact, the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and that a great bulk of the Wagner Act is retained. As in-
dicated within the scope of this article, many of the amendments effect-
ing the employer unfair labor practices were dictated by twelve years
84 9(a) "That any individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such
grievance adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative,
as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective
bargaining contract or agreement then in effect. Provided further, That the
bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such
adjustment."85 Torff, "Taft-Hartley Act and Collective Bargaining," 43 ILL. L. REV. 323,
351 (1948).
s N.L.R.B. v. Hughes Tool Co., 147 F. (2d) 69 (C.C.A. 5th, 1945); 10 N.L.R.B.
ANN. REP. 63-64 (1945).87 Senate Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (1947).
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experience in the administration of the Wagner Act and not with-
out careful consideration should they be discarded automatically in
a general antipathy toward an Act bearing the approval of the 80th
Congress.
Sound labor relations cannot be established by litigation; neither
can sound labor relations be fostered and promoted as the result of
extremes and various "trends". Rather, harmonious labor relations
flow from a well established policy accepted by the parties coupled
with the cooperation of the parties through mutual trust and respect.
While changes in policy are not to be condemned, in as much as amend-
ments to this Act are almost a certainty, moderation and understand-
ing must be the keynote. Accordingly, the primary purpose of this
article is to survey the underlying reason and resulting effect of some of
the amendments upon the employer unfair labor practices, thus aiding
in an informed consideration of the direction of any proposed change
in our current labor policy.
